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Abstract 
We propose and analyze a dynamic implementation of the property-rights model of cognitive radio. A primary link has the possibility to 
lease the owned spectrum to a MAC network of secondary nodes, in exchange for cooperation in the form of distributed space-time coding 
(DSTC). The cooperation and competition between the primary and secondary network are cast in the framework of sequential game. On 
one hand, the primary link attempts to maximize its quality of service in terms of signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR); on the 
other hand, nodes in the secondary network compete for transmission within the leased time-slot following a power control mechanism.  
We consider both a baseline model with complete information and a more practical version with incomplete information, using the 
backward induction approach for the former and providing approximate algorithm for the latter. Analysis and numerical results show that 
our models and algorithms provide a promising framework for fair and effective spectrum sharing, both between primary and secondary 
networks and among secondary nodes.   
Keywords: Cognitive radio; spectrum leasing; property-rights; sequential game; cooperative transmission; distributed heterogeneous opportunistic power 
control.  
1. Introduction 
The concept of dynamic spectrum access is currently under investigation as a promising paradigm to achieve efficient use 
of the frequency resource. Different sharing models allow the coexistence of licensed (primary) users and unlicensed 
(secondary or cognitive radios, CR) in the same bandwidth through different schemes. The common models [1,2] do not 
assume any interaction between primary links and CRs, while the property-rights(or spectrum leasing) [1,3] models allow the 
primary terminals owning a given bandwidth lease it for a fraction of time to CRs in exchange for appropriate remuneration. 
Although both kinds of models have limitations, the property-rights models have seldom been analyzed in the 
communication engineering literature. In the effort to merge techniques and strategies, we propose a dynamic implementation 
of the property-rights model, and thus improve spectrum efficiency. 
The efficiency of an implementation of the property-rights model depends on concrete techniques such as resource 
allocation and management, cooperative communication, spectrum access and pricing schemes etc. R. D. Yates provides a 
framework of uplink power control for the cellular wireless communication systems in [4], to minimize the transmitting 
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power while guarantee the target SINRs. Authors of [5,6] put forward opportunistic power control frameworks which are 
applicable to systems supporting opportunistic communications and yield significant improvement in throughput when 
compared with conventional target tracking approach in [4]. Authors of [7,8] define cost or utility functions that consist of 
weighted sum of power and achievable QoS, gain substantial power savings while slightly reduce the achieved SINR, 
compared to the power balancing algorithm. Authors of [9-12] aim at improving convergence rate and provide optimizing 
technologies such as  combination-optimization, successive over-relaxation method and exponential type of power update 
function etc.[13,14] survey various coding schemes and protocols used in cooperating communication.[15-19] model 
particular distributive resource allocation problems as potential games or S-modular games where there exist coupling among 
the strategy vectors of all players and analyze the convergence of their algorithms. B. Wang etc. [20, 21] propose a 
Stackelberg game theoretic framework for distributed resource allocation over multiuser cooperative communication 
networks to improve the system performance. [22, 23] focus on fairness and efficiency of their resource allocation algorithms 
in scenes where nodes have various QoS requirements. Although results in the above papers can increase spectrum efficiency 
to some extent, they focus on either unlicensed spectrum or underlay or overlay [24] mode, neither of them considers 
interaction between primary links and CRs. 
Authors of [1, 3] compare property-rights with common models, O. lleri etc. [2] put forward two property-rights model of 
dynamic spectrum access, yet limited to illustrative explanation. We focus on combining techniques with spectrum leasing 
model and propose a spectrum sharing framework. By helping the primary link through cooperating communication and thus 
improving its QoS, secondary terminals are granted the use of a given spectral resource by the incumbent primary. We 
investigate both scenes with or without complete information. Our works differ from the work of O. Simeone etc.[25] in three 
aspects: firstly, our secondary network is a MAC system while O. Simeone’s an ad hoc; secondly, O. Simeone etc. choose 
decode-and-forward schemes (DF) and assert that amplify-and-forward ones (AF) are not applicable in their framework, we 
instead adopt AF for the sake of comparison despite both AF and DF schemes fit our framework; and thirdly, we provide 
feasible approximate solution for our models while O. Simeone etc. only give the solvable conditions of their model. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Secondary spectrum access through cooperation-based dynamic spectrum leasing  
 (a) primary transmission  (b) DSTC cooperation  (c)secondary transmission 
2. System model 
Overall, the considered framework is characterized by a hierarchical structure, where three entities (primary link between 
primary transmitter (PT) and receiver (PR), secondary base-station (BS) and CRs take turn to act. The high level is modeled 
as a sequential game between primary and cognitive network. On one hand, one player (the primary link) optimizes its 
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strategy (leased time) based on the knowledge of the effects of its decision on the behavior of a second player (the secondary 
network, including its BS and CRs); on the other hand, cognitive BS decides whether to cooperate and if so, the cooperative 
scale (number of cooperating relays to be allowed) based on the leased time while cognitive CRs decide the transmitting 
power. The low level involves CRs competing among themselves for transmission within the leased time-slot, following a 
distributed opportunistic power control mechanism. 
2.1. Medium access control layer 
We consider the system sketched in Fig. 1, where a PT communicates with the intended PR in slots of NS symbols. In the 
same bandwidth, a secondary multiple access network composed of | |K = S  CRs is seeking to exploit possible transmission 
opportunities. The primary link grants the use of the bandwidth to CRs in exchange for cooperation so as to improve the 
quality of the communication link to its receiver PR. Although metrics such as link capacity, bit-error rate (BER) or outage 
probability etc. may all be qualified candidates, they are all monotone functions of SINR. We choose SINR as utility metric, 
both for its basic, and simplicity.  
In particular, the primary decides whether to use the entire slot for direct transmission to PR or to employ cooperation. In 
the latter case, a fraction α of the slot (0<α<1/2) is used for transmission from PT to PR and to CRs in  (see Fig. 1-(a)). 
The second fraction α of the slot is dedicated to cooperation: The set S of cognitive relays form a distributed  antenna 
array that cooperatively relay the primary codeword through DSTC [13,14] towards PR (Fig. 1-(b)). And in the last subslot of 
duration (1-2α) NS symbols, all the active CRs are allowed to transmit their own data (Fig. 1-(c)), in which the transmission 
scheme amounts to multiple access channels with distributed power control [4-6].  
C ⊂S S
|C C| S
2.2. Physical layer  
The channels between nodes are modeled as independent proper complex Gaussian random variables, invariant within 
each slot, but generally varying over the slots (i.e., Rayleigh block-fading channels). We use the following notation to denote 
the instantaneous fading channels in each block: Ph denotes the complex channel gain between PT and PR; ,PS ih the channel 
gain between PT and secondary transmitter STi; between STi and PR; between STi, and cognitive BS. 
Moreover,
,SP ih ,S ih 1, ...,i =   K
2| |P Pg h= , , and  denote the respective fading power gains. 2, ,| |PS i PS ig h= 2, ,|SP i SP ig h= |
|
2
, ,| |S i S ig h=
As leader in the sequential game, the primary link announces its selection of time ratio α and the rule of relay selection, 
the cognitive BS follows and announces its selection of the number  of cognitive relays , finally cooperative CRs 
decide their transmission power , (the maximal allowed power of each nodes is 
| CN = S
1( ,..., )Np p=p max[0, ]NP∈p maxP ) through 
power control. Notice that each of the N CRs in  is constrained to use the same power for both cooperation and own 
traffic (we introduce this constraint lest a selfish CR would contribute little to in earning spectrum opportunities, yet use full 
power for own traffic. See last two subslots in Fig. 1-(b) and Fig. 1-(c)). Assuming that primary link keeps the total consumed 
energy in a slot as constant, and the transmission power of the primary when not leasing is expressed as
CS
0
pP . Finally, the 
single-sided spectral density of the independent white Gaussian noise at the receivers (both of primary and secondary 
network) is . 0N
We are interested in two scenarios characterized by different assumptions about the available channel state information 
(CSI) at different entities and different constraints on the available transmission strategies: 
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1) Complete and perfect information (Section 3): in this baseline case, the primary link, the cognitive BS and the CRs are 
assumed to be aware of the instantaneous realizations of all the channel power gains in the system (i.e., Pg , ,PS ig , ,SP ig  and 
,S ig ), and the payoffs of all players under every strategy profile are common knowledge[26]. 
2) Incomplete information (Section 4): in this scenario, we remove the idealistic assumptions made in the baseline case 
discussed above. In particular, we assume that the primary link only knows Pg , ,PS ig and ,SP ig , while the secondary BS 
are only aware of all the fading channels within the secondary network, ,S ig . In other words, neither primary link nor 
secondary network has priori knowledge of channels inside the other peer. 
3. Complete information spectrum leasing model 
In this section, we describe and analyze spectrum leasing based on space-time coded cooperation within a sequential game 
framework under the assumption of complete information. We first discuss the primary part (leader) of the model in 
subsection 3.1, and the secondary network (follower) part which includes secondary BS and CRs in Sec. 3.2 and 3.3. We then 
provide a backward induction approach for the hierarchical spectrum leasing model in Sec.3.4. 
3.1. Primary link model 
Based on the available instantaneous CSI, the primary link selects the slot allocation parametersα towards the aim of 
optimizing its SINR in a slot. To start with, in the baseline case of  no leasing, the signal-to-noise-ration (SNR) on the direct 
link between the PT and PR is 
,
0 0
0/PT PR PPg P NΓ = ,this can be seen as the reservation payoff[26],in other words, the payoffs 
that primary link can ensure without cooperation. 
Instead, if the fraction of time leased to the CRs is 1-2α > 0，then the transmitting power of PT is now 0 /
PP
P P α= , and 
the SNR at PR and STi in the first phase is respectively , 0/PT PR P PP NΓ = g  and , , /PT i PS i P 0g P NΓ = . In the second phase, the 
second nodes assigned as cooperative relays forward the frame received in the first phase to PR. We assume the use of a 
collaborative scheme based on amplify-and-forward (AF) multihop and space-time coding (authors of [25] declare that AF 
schemes do not provide the necessary flexibility in slot allocation needed in their scenario. We point out that both DF and AF 
schemes can be used in our framework, yet we choose AF for the sake of comparison). The PR combines the directly 
received signal at the PR and relayed signals from , using techniques such as maximal ratio combining (MRC). In this case 
the achievable SINR at the PR reads [13, 20]: 
iS
, ,
, ,
0 , ,( )i
P i PS i SP i
PT ST PR
P PS i i SP i
P p g g
N P g p g N
Γ = + + 0
|
                       ⑴  
In which  is the power of relay i. If there are ip ∈p | CN = S  relays helping primary link, the totally achievable SINR at 
PR is:                         ⑵  | |, ,1( , )
C
I
C
AF PT PR PT ST PRi=Γ = Γ + Γ∑ Sp S ,
2)
In which . To summarize, the utility of primary link is given by  max[0, ]
NP∈p
,
0
( , , )
2 ( , ), (0,1/
PT PRC
P C
AF
U α α α
⎧Γ⎪= ⎨ Γ ∈⎪⎩
S p
p S
,             other
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The primary link aims at solving the following optimization problem: 
max0 1/ 2
max ( , , ), . . , [0, ]C CU s t Pα α< ≤ ⊆ ∈S p S S pP N                    ⑶ 
3.2. The heterogeneous opportunistic power control among cognitive nodes 
? The distributed power control model under heterogeneous QoS requirement 
Given the leasing fraction 1-2α and the set of cooperative relays , we investigate the power control problem among CRs 
(players) based on static non-cooperating game theory. Based on whether a node is selected to relay for the primary link, the 
set of CRs can be classified into two types: the set of cooperative cognitive radios (CCRs), denoted as  and the set of non-
cooperating cognitive radios (NCCRs), denoted as . As the CCRs gain communication opportunity for the entire 
cognitive network by relaying for primary link, these nodes deserve higher QoS (represented in, e.g., SINR) than NCCRs. 
That is to say, each class has distinct QoS requirements. The cognitive BS compensates CCR k for its cost (of power in 
relaying) and contributions (in gaining the communication chance) by setting a target SINR , which turns out to be 
function of 
CS
CS
\NC C=S S S
,
th
kΓS
α (fraction of slot used by the primary link), | (CRs’ total) and |  (number of CCRs). The difference in 
QoS requirement of CCRs and NCCRs results in distinct utility functions. The utility of CCR k is given by:  
|S |
U pα −p
CS
( , , )Ck k k   , , ,, ) ( ,| |,| |)
th C
k k k kgρ α α= Γ − ΓS S S S S ,(1 ( , )) (0,1/ 2)k k kg p: ( + ρ α α− ∈S ,    
k
                 ⑷ 
In which is the achieved SINR of CCR k, and the first term denotes how close the real SINR of CCR k is from its 
target , the second term represents cost of k in power (maybe also in compensating the interference it causes to other 
nodes). We introduce weighting factor 
,kΓS
,
th
kΓS
,( , )k gρ α S  to tradeoff the preference of CCR k between reaching its QoS target and 
decreasing its cost (in power). Assuming that the BS adopts single-user-decoding and takes signals from other nodes as 
interference in detecting signal of node k, then , , 0 ,/( )
N
k k k j jg j kp N g p≠+ ∑S S S kΓ =  ( −p  denotes the power strategies of nodes 
other than k).  
The utility function of NCCR k accounts for the difference between the achievable SINR and the cost of transmitted 
energy: 
( , )NCk k kU p −p  , ,: (0, )k k k ,(1 (0, )) (0,1/ 2)k k kg pgρ= ΓS S ρ α− − ∈S ,                        ⑸ 
Note thatgiven utility functions defined as in (4) and (5), a CCR should try to minimize its utility, while a NCCR should 
maximize its utility.  Thus the power control game in the cognitive network can be expressed as: 
max
max
0
0
: min ( , , ),
: max ( , ),
k
k
C C
k k kp P
NC NC
k k kp P
CCR U p k
NCCR U p k
α −≤ ≤
−≤ ≤
⎧ ∀ ∈⎪⎨ ∀ ∈⎪⎩
p S
p S
 
                   ⑹ 
The optimal solution of model (6) is the function of slot fraction α ,the particular partition  and  of nodes set 
,which can be denoted as .It is of worth to note that the exact form of 
SINR target  and weighting factor 
CS NCS
S * * *1( , , ) ( ( , , ),... ( , , ))
C NC C NC C NC
Kp pα α α=p S S S S S S
, ( ,| |,| |)
th C
k αΓS S S ,( , )k g kρ α S determines the position of  in the feasible 
power region 
* ( , , )C NCαp S S
max[0, ]
KP , and thus influences the achievable SINR of each CR as well as payoff of the primary link exploiting 
cooperation communication. Further analysis and numerical outcome can be found in subsection 5.1. 
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? The iterative algorithm 
Using best response (BR) approach [19, 26] on model (6), we construct iterative algorithms both for CCRs and NCCRs:  
( )
, ,( 1) 2
, ( )
, ,
, ,( 1) 2
( )
,
( , )
( ,| |,| |) [ ] : ( )
2(1 ( , ))
(0, )
[ ] : ( )
2(1 (0, ))
n
k k kn th C Ck
k k kn
k k k k
k k kn NC
k kn
k k k
g gIp
g g I
g g
p
g I
ρ αα ρ α
ρ
ρ
+
+
⎧ = Γ + = Λ⎪ −⎪⎨⎪ = = Λ⎪ −⎩
S S
S
S S
S S
S
S S p
p
CCR: 
NCCR:   
                 ⑺ 
( ) ( )
0 ,
Nn
k j k
n
S jI N g≠= + ∑ p j                     ⑻ 
In which ( )nkI represents noise and interference on signals of node k from other nodes in iteration , which corresponding 
to power control strategies of other nodes. Note that the fixed points (if exist) of iteration algorithm (7) thus formulated 
coincide with Nash Equilibrium (NE) [26] of game (6).  
( )n
We might as well assume that consists of the front N nodes of the K CRs. Then iteration function CS
max max( ) :[0, ] [0, ]
K KP P→Λ p  will produce a sequence of power vectors in the form of ( ) =Λ p  
. 1 1( ( ),..., ( ), ( ),..., ( ))
C C NC NC
N N K+Λ Λ Λ Λp p p p
? Convergence analysis 
Theorem 1 For given α  and , if a fixed point  exists for the iterative function defined as (7), 
then this fixed pint is unique, and the power vector sequence produced by  converges to . 
,C NCS S * ( , , )C NCαp S S ( )Λ p
( ){ }np ( )Λ p * ( , , )C NCαp S S
Proof: From Theorem 9 and 10 of [5], we know that if  meets the property of two-sided scalability and a fixed point 
exists for it, then this fixed pint is unique and  converges. Thus we need only to prove that  satisfies the following 
two-sided scalability: 
( )Λ p
( )Λ p ( )Λ p
1, 'μ μμ∀ >  ≤ ≤
p p p  ( ) ( ') ( )μμ⇒ < <
Λ p
Λ p Λ p We first simplify (7) to the form 
of
1 2
3
1( ) ( )
( )
1( )
( )
C
k
NC
k
a I a
I
a
I
⎧Λ = +⎪⎪⎨⎪Λ =⎪⎩
p p
p
p
p
k
k
k
  
, in which ,1
,
( ,| |,| |)
k
th C
k
a
g
αΓ= S
S
S S
, , 22 ,
,
( , )
[ ]
2(1 ( , ))
k S k
S k
k S k
g
a g
g
ρ α
ρ α= − , 
, 2
3 ,
,
(0, )
[ ]
2(1 (0, ))
k S k
S k
k S k
g
a g
g
ρ
ρ= −  
Applying the definition of in (8), it’s easy to show that ( )kI p
( )
' ( ')k k k
I I Iμ μμ μ≤ ≤ ⇒ < <
pp p p p p( )  
Firstly, for a CCR k, we have 
( )
( ')
C
Ck
kμ
Λ − Λp p 1 2 1 21 1( ( ) ) ( ( ')( ) ( ')k kk k
a I a a I a
I Iμ= + − +p pp p
1 )  
1 2
( ) 1 1( ( ')) ( )
( ) ( ')
k
k
k k
Ia I a
I Iμ μ= − + −
p p
p p 1 2
( ) ( ') ( )
( ( ')) (
( ) ( ')
k k
k
k k
I Ia I a
I I
μ
μ μ
−= − +p pp
p p
)k
I p  
As ( ) ( ')k k
I Iμ − <
p p 0 , ( ') ( )k kI Iμ−p p 0< ,and 、 、1a 2a μ 、 、 are all greater than 0, thus ( ')kI p ( )kI p
( )
( ')
C
Ck
kμ
Λ − Λ <p p 0 , namely ( ) ( ')
C
Ck
kμ
Λ < Λp p . In a similar way as shown before we have . ( ') ( )C Ck kμΛ < Λp p
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Secondly, for a NCCR k, 
( ) 1 1( ')
( ) ( ')
NC
NCk
k
k k
a a
I Iμ μ
Λ − Λ = −p p
p p3 3
1 1 1( )
( ) ( ')k k
a
I Iμ= −p p3  
( ') ( )
( )
( ) ( ')
k k
k k
I Ia
I I
μ
μ
−= <p p
p p3
0 i.e., ( ) ( ')
NC
NCk
kμ
Λ < Λp p .Similarly we have . ( ') ( )NC NCk kμΛ < Λp p
Thus we conclude that  satisfies two-sided scalability. According conclusions in theorem 9 and 10 of [5], It is now 
obvious that the theorem holds.■ 
( )Λ p
Theorem 2 For any given strategy of the primary link and the cognitive BS, there exists fixed points for iterative function 
 defined in (7). ( )Λ p
Proof: According to the definition in (7), it is obvious that   is continuous at all .Also notice that the iteration 
is constrained by the maximal transmitting power, i.e. the outputs are up-bounded by
( )Λ p 0≥p
maxP , according to theorem 15 in [5]. It 
is now obvious that the theorem holds. ■ 
Combining theorem 1 and 2, we conclude that there exists unique fixed point for iterative function  and the iterative 
process converges to it.  
( )Λ p
It’s worth noticing that when all CRs are chosen to be CCRs, the iteration (7) reduces to 
( )
,( 1) 2
, ( )
, ,
( , )
[
2(1 ( , ))
n
k kn th k
k k n
k k k k
,] k
g gI
p
g g I
ρ α
ρ α
+ = Γ + −
S
S
S S
S , which fits into two-sided scalability type of power control; and when neither 
node cooperates for the primary link (assuming that the CRs are still allowed to transmit), (7) reduces to 
,( 1) 2
( )
,
(0, )
[
2(1 (0, ))
k kn
k n
k k k
,] k
g g
p
g I
ρ
ρ
+ = −
S
S
S ， the type II standard power control. In conclusion, our opportunistic power control 
algorithm generalizes power control algorithm to support heterogeneous QoS requirements.  
3.3. Cognitive base-station model 
We define utility of cognitive BS (representing the cognitive network) as the difference between total achievable SINR 
and total power cost of all nodes:  
| | | |C NC
CR ,1
max
c
( , , , ) ( )
C NC
k
kk
pU
P
α +== Γ −∑ S S SS S p                                             ⑼ 
In which c>0 is a constant. We brief  as in the following. It is obvious that when the 
primary link chooses no leasing, the cognitive network has zero utility. The BS determines the number of allowed CCRs by 
the following model ( balances the utility of primary and secondary network):  
C NC
CR ( , , , )U α S S p C( , , )CRU α S p
D
C
CR
0 | | | |
max ( , , )
C
U α
≤ ≤S S
S pD   P(1 ) ( , , ),   s.t. 0 1CU α+ − < <S pD D
3.4. Analysis of spectrum leasing sequential game of complete information  
As the actions of primary (determining α ),cognitive BS(deciding the number of CCRs) and CRs (setting their 
transmitting power) take place sequentially and they announce their choices, combining the assumption 1) in subsection 2.2, 
this model pertains to complete and perfection information dynamic game and we provide the backward induction [26] 
approach for this particular model in the following:  
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? Firstly we should derive the best response functions (BRF) of CRs given α  and .We have shown in subsection 
3.2 that the aforesaid cognitive power control algorithm converges to the unique fixed point (denoted as 
 hereafter) of the iteration function. We also use this notation to represent BRF of CRs. 
,C NCS S
* ( , , )C NCαp S S
* ( , )Cαp S
? We now considering BRF of cognitive BS givenα . As BS can theoretically solve power control among the CRs, hence 
can guess out BRF  of the CRs, the problem BS has to solve comes down to: *( , )Cαp S
*
0 | | | |
max ( , , ( , ))
C
CR CU α α
≤ ≤S S
S p SD *(1 ) ( , , ( , ))CPU α α+ − S p SD C                           ⑽ 
Given the ordering of candidate CRs by the primary, there are | |K = S  possible size of the CCRs set ,and the BS must 
solve both power control(7) and optimization (10) for K times altogether, and picks the maximal utility (if unique) from them, 
then the responding number of CCRs is just the solution  to be found. 
CS
* *| | ( , ( , ))C α αS p SC
C
? Finally, we come to the BR of primary link. Similar to analysis in the above step, the primary can dope out BRF of the 
BS(i.e., )and CRs(i.e., ) to all feasible * *| | ( , ( , ))C α αS p S *( , )Cαp S α , the problem of primary link boils down to: 
                                ⑾ * * *
0 1/ 2
max ( , ( , ),| | ( , ( , )))C C CpUα α α α α< ≤ p S S p S
If the maximization (11) also has unique solution (denoted as )，we can get the backward induction 
solution  of the sequential game，and this solution falls into subgame-perfect 
NE[26], which is stable in the sense of NE. 
* * *( ,| | )Cα p S
* * * * * * *( ( ,| | ), ( *,| | ),| | ( *,| | )))C C Cα α αp S p S S SC
There are several difficulties in the above approach. Firstly, it is almost impossible to give explicit expressions of 
 and *( , )Cαp S *α ; secondly, to produce the optimal ordering of candidate CCRs and further the optimal solution *α , the 
primary must calculate  under all potential ,which totally amounts to , and dopes 
out  and  for all 
*, ,( ),1m C m m Mα ≤ ≤S ,C mS -1
1
2K m
m
M == ∑
* *| | ( , ( , ))C Cα αS p S *( , )Cαp S 0 1/ 2α< <  and . Obviously, although backward induction is 
theoretically a mature method for complete information dynamic games, yet as 
C ⊆S S
α  and  are defined in continuous region 
while ordering of candidate CCRs belongs to the domain of permutation and combination, further more, the strategies of the 
primary, the cognitive BS and CRs are coupling, thus it is actually very hard to find the strict optimal solution of our 
hierarchical model. We omit approximate analysis here, as although this version of model builds a base for further analysis, 
it’s somewhat too Utopian. It worths to point out that the analysis in Section 4 is totally applicable for this scenario. 
p
4. Incomplete information spectrum leasing model and its solution  
The analysis of this section is based on CSI assumption 2) in subsection 2.2. Here the primary has no priori knowledge as 
to those channels inside the cognitive network, thus is not able to reckon the strategy profiles of the cognitive CRs. So the 
backward induction approach in subsection 3.4 doesn’t apply here. We simplify the cognitive BS model in subsection 3.3 and 
propose an approximate solution for this incomplete information version of the spectrum leasing model.  
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4.1. The simplified model of the cognitive network  
The model and algorithm of power control among the CRs remain the same as subsection 3.2. We reduce the cognitive BS 
model in subsection 3.3 such that BS determines the number of CCRs using the following formula | | [(1 2 ) | |]CN α += = −S S , 
in which [ ]x + denotes taking the minimal integer greater than or equal to x.  
4.2. Solution to the primary model  
Assuming the primary knows the strategy of cognitive BS under the simplified model, and then primary model (3) 
becomes:   
P(0,1/ 2)
max ( , , )CUα α∈ S p
,
0
| |(0,1/ 2)
, , ,1
,                                   other
max
2 ( ), (0,1/ 2)
PT PR
C
iPT PR PT ST PRi
α α α∈ =
⎧Γ⎪= ⎨ Γ + Γ ∈⎪⎩ ∑ S max
. . , [0, ]Cs t P⊆ ∈S S p N                  ⑿ 
Problem (12) can be decomposed into three parts: 1, how to determine relay power ; 2, how to order 
candidate relays; 3, how to find the suboptimal slot fraction 
, 1,...,ip i N=
*α) .We discuss them separately in the following. 
? Determining  , 1,...,ip i N=
According to the incomplete information assumption, the primary has no priori knowledge of , , 1,...ig j =S K  and thus is 
not able to reckon . We consider two alternative schemes: 1, setting *( , )Cαp S , 1,...,ip i N=  according to uniform distribution 
in ; 2, setting all  equal. max[0, ]
NP , 1,...,ip i N=
? Ordering candidate relays 
Scheme 1, Relay-SINR(R-SINR) scheme: Ordering the candidate relays decreasingly according to , ,iPT ST PRΓ . We have the 
following conclusion: 
Theorem 3 Given the candidate relays set S and slot fraction α ，ordering  decreasingly according to S , ,iPT ST PRΓ  is 
equivalent to the optimal ordering under utility maximization. 
Proof: To produce the optimal ordering rule under utility maximization，in principle, we should compare the primary 
utility under all possible (which total up to ) and then extract the optimal ordering of the candidate relays, 
as pointed out in subsection 3.4. Assuming that  is a permutation of all candidates relays ordering 
decreasingly according to 
,C mS -1
1
2K m
m
M == ∑
* * *
*
1 2
( ) ( , ,..., )
K
S S S=S
, ,iPT ST PR
Γ  and 1 2( ) ( , ,..., )KS S S=S is any permutation other than . For given S and*( )S α , 
( ) is the number of CCRs given by BS, is the set of front N elements of  and 
is the set of front N elements of ( . It’s easy to show that 
[(1 2 ) | |]N α += − S 0 |N≤ ≤ S |
k
*( )CS *( )S
( )CS )S
*|( ) | (| |)
, , , ,1 1
C C
iPT ST PR PT ST PRi k= =Γ ≥ Γ∑ ∑S S ，Noticing that relays 
only show in the second term of (12), thus we also have . i.e., ordering S  decreasingly 
according to 
*
P P( , ( ) , ) ( , ( ), )
CU Uα α≥S p S pC
, ,iPT ST PR
Γ  is equivalent to the optimal ordering under utility maximization■ 
According to theorem 3, we know scheme R-SINR is equivalent to the optimal ordering. Further more, this ordering can 
be finished within (using, for instance, QKSORT [27]).When combined with the above two power (| | log(| |))O S S
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approximating schemes, we get Relay-Random-power-SINR (abbreviated to RR) and Relay-Same-power-SINR (abbreviated 
to RS) scheme. 
Scheme 2, Channel-Product (CP) scheme: Noticing contribution of each relay to primary utility is limited by both ,g PS i  
and , an instinct scheme is to ordering S  according to ,gSP i , ,g gPS i SP i . 
? Approximating *α by segmental border values  
For given number of CCRs by BS and the corresponding CCRs set , the primary can pick slot 
fraction within
* [(1 2 ) | |]N α += − S *( )CS
* *1 1 1(1 ) (1 )
2 | | 2 |
N α−− > ≥ −
S S |
N . Thus (12) can actually be divided into | | 1+S  sub-
problems:
* *
*
P
1 1 1(1 ) (1 )
2 | | 2 | |
max ( , ( ) , )C
N N
U
α
α
−− > ≥ −
S S
S p  
,
*
* *
0
, ,1 1 1(1 ) (1 ) 12 | | 2 | |
0 0 , , 0
,                other
max
2 ( ), (0,1/ 2)
( )
PT PR
N P i PS i SP iPS PN N
i
P PS i i SP i
P p g gg P
N N P g p g Nα
α α−− > ≥ − =
⎧Γ⎪= ⎨ + ∈⎪ + +⎩ ∑S S
            ⒀ ** max. .0 | |, [0, ]Ns t N P≤ ≤ ∈S p
And , in which 
*
* *
Parg max ( , ( ) , )
i
C
iUα
α α= S p* * ,0 | |i iα ≤ ≤ S  are optimal solutions of the | | sub-problems as (13).  1+S
One simplification for these sub-problems is to simply investigate the border slot fraction 
*1 (1 )
2 | |
Nα = −
S
)  and the 
corresponding border utility for each given :*N
*
*
P
1( (1 ), ( ) , )
2 | |
CNU − S p
S
)
                       ⒁ 
Thus we reduce the computing complexity from | | 1+S  optimization sub-problems (13) to merely | |  evaluation (14). 
Pick the biggest value
1+S
*
PU
)
 from these  utilities, and the corresponding slot fraction | | 1+S *αˆ  is the sub-optimal border 
approximating. 
5. Numerical simulation 
We considered a 2-km-square cell with cognitive BS centered at the origin and CRs were chosen randomly from a uniform 
distribution [7] in the square, while PT and PR are located randomly within 1-km-square cell centered at the BS. 
. Background receiver noise power within the user’s bandwidth of  was used in the 
simulations. The channel gain was determined according to , in which r is the distance between the transmitter and the 
receiver, . We adopt typical value simulation in subsection 5.1 and 5.2 while in 5.3 we use Monte Carlo methods. 
max 600P m= W W0 -133N dB=
-ah r=
2a =
5.1. Simulating the heterogeneous power control in cognitive network  
C. W. Sung etc. point out in [5] that their opportunistic power control algorithm can achieve tenfold throughput increase 
when compared with target tracking. Yet it magnifies the near–far effect and thus intensifies unfairness. As a generalization 
of C. W. Sung’s algorithm in supporting heterogeneous QoS requirements (of CCRs and NCCRs), our algorithm inherits its 
merit in throughput while avoids its weakness of unfairness by introducing target SINR  and weighting , ( ,| |, | |)
th C
k αΓS S S
 10
factor ,( , )k g kρ α S . We in this subsection simply investigate our iterative algorithm from the view points of converging rate, 
fairness and the compensation for CCRs etc.  
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Fig. 2 Heterogeneous opportunistic power control (convergence & fairness)  (a) Received SINR& channel quality of each link pair( 2λ = )  (b) Received 
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The exact form of SINR target and weighting factor , ( ,| |, | |)
th C
k αΓS S S ,( , )k g kρ α S  influence position of the fixed point, 
converging rate and further others. We set 
/ 2
, 3 / 4 / 2
,
2( , )
g 2k k k
eg
e
λα
λαρ α = +S S  and , ( ,| |,| |) | | | |
th C
k C
λααΓ = ⋅S S S S S             ⒂ 
in the simulation. Then (4) and (5) come down to respectively:
/ 2
3/ 4 / 2
,
2( , , ) :
g 2
C
k k k
k
eU p
e
λα
λαα − = +Sp                            ⒃ 
3 / 4
,
,3 / 4 3 / 4
, ,
g2( , ) :
g 2 g 2
kNC
k k k k
k k
U p p− = Γ −+ +
S
S
S S
p k                    ⒄ 
Combining (15) and (7), we get the following iteration: 
( )
,( 1)
3/ 2 ( )
, ,
,( 1)
3/ 2 ( )
,
: :
g| | | |
1NCCR: : ( )  
g
n
kn Ck
k knC
k k k
kn NC
k kn
k k
gI eCCR p
g I
g
p
I
λαλα+
+
⎧ = + =⎪ ⋅⎪⎨⎪ = = Λ⎪⎩
S
S S
S
S
p
S S
p
( )Λ
                                                 ⒅ 
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In Fig.2 we give typical simulation result where | | 20=S  in which 1~10 belong to  and CS α =0.25. 2-(a) and 2-(b) show 
three properties of our algorithm: 1, the SINRs of all CRs are positively correlated with their channel gains; 2, CCRs always 
achieve higher SINR than NCCRs under similar channel conditions; 3, We can increase the SINRs of CCRs relative to which 
of NCCRs by increasing λ . While 2-(c) and 2-(d) show that our algorithm boasts rapid converging in one hand, and validate 
the above property 2 and 3 in the other hand. 
In Table 1, the Unitary SINR is defined as SINR vs. channel power gain ratio of a node; SINR-power-ratio is just as its 
name implies; Relative Increment (Relative- INC) means(Value_of_CCR – Value_of_NCCR)/ Value_of_NCCR. With the 
increasing of λ , the first column shows that power of CCRs increase while that of NCCRs decrease; the second column 
shows similar trend of Unitary SINR with the first column; yet the third column shows that the SINR gain of CCR by 
increasing λ  is costly in power, i.e., The gain of CCR in SINR accords with law of diminishing marginal utility [26, 28]. 
 
Table 1   Performance comparison between CCRs and NCCRs ( 2 4 6 and 8λ = 、、  ) 
Mean average  
Transmitting power  
Mean average  
Unitary SINR 
Mean average SINR-power-ratio 
λ 
CCR 
(W) 
NCCR 
(W) 
Relative- 
INC 
CCR 
(dB) 
NCCR 
(dB) 
Relative- 
INC 
CCR NCCR 
Relative- 
INC 
2 0.37549 0.24292 54.6% 43.2293 41.2472 4.81% 115.126 169.794 -7.6% 
4 0.37639 0.14375 95.8% 44.2075 39.8433 10.6% 117.451 277.163 -22.3% 
6 0.37663 0.08513 120.0% 44.892 38.1724 16.3% 119.193 448.385 -46.0% 
8 0.37692 0.05077 134.3% 45.3412 36.3165 21.9% 120.294 715.305 -83.2% 
 
From Fig. 2 and Tab. 1, we arrive at the conclusion that our power control algorithm is fast, flexible and fair in that it 
converges in a few iterations; it can compensate CCRs flexibly and it is capable of overcoming near–far effect.  
5.2. Simulation of the approximating solutions for the primary network 
In this subsection we investigate how close our estimations (using the three schemes given in subsection 4.2) is to the real 
optimal value (i.e. *αˆ vs. *α  and *PU)  vs. *PU ).  
The typical simulating results are shown in Fig. 3 in which | | 10=S .We see that three estimated primary utility curves do 
not overlap with each other and they are generally below the respective theoretic utility curves. Numbers inside parentheses 
of X-axis in (b) denotes the estimated *| |CS
)
 of each scheme, including RR, RS and CP scheme, which all equal to 4, 
corresponding to slot fraction . Noticing that the three estimated optimal utility *ˆ 0.3α = *PU
)
all locate at the summit of each 
utility curve (proving that the three approximating schemes are indeed valid.), and those of RR and CP are almost same, 
which are somewhat higher than that of RS. Furthermore, it can be see that the reservation payoff is lower than all utility 
curves, indicating that cooperative leasing always dominates non-cooperation, no matter how many CRs are chosen as CCRs. 
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Do the three approximating schemes produce same *| |CS
)
 (1-RR, 2-RS, 3-CP)? 
5.3. Monte Carlo simulation of primary and secondary cooperative leasing  
Each of the above two subsections investigates only the primary link or secondary network. Here we consider 
performances of both, under our cooperative leasing model. | | 10=S , and we repeat our simulation for 100 times. Fig.4 
shows that the mean utilities estimated by three approximating schemes are almost equal (4-(a)), all less than the respective 
theoretic value, and same can be said about power (4-(b)) and Unitary SINR (4-(c)) of CCRs. From 4-(d), we see that within 
the 100 repeating, there are about 70 times that all three schemes produce equal | , about 20 times all unequal and about 3 
times RR equals RS yet not equal to CP.   
|CS
To be brief, although the three approximating scheme do not always produce same result, yet it’s difficult to distinguish 
which is better from the view of mean performance.  
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We conclude this section as follows: 1, both subsection 5.2 and 5.3 indicate that generally our cooperative leasing 
framework guarantees that cognitive network achieves communication chance while primary link gains utility higher than its 
reservation payoff.  2, our heterogeneous power control algorithm overcomes the unfairness shortcoming of algorithm in [5] 
in addition to inherits its high throughput merit; 3, the proposed approximating schemes can achieve valid sub-optimal output 
and reduce the computational complexity greatly.  
6. Conclusion 
In this manuscript, we propose and analyze a dynamic implementation of hierarchical property-rights model of cognitive 
radio. We give the backward induction approach for the complete information model and provide approximating algorithm 
for the incomplete information version. Analysis and numerical results show that our models and algorithms provide a 
promising framework for fair and effective spectrum sharing. 
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